Liberal Foundations of Democratic Authority

Representation 46 (1):19-34 (2010)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In Democratic Authority, David Estlund argues that decision-procedures are to be judged solely by their tendency to generate morally superior decisions, but that because any relationship of authority must be acceptable to all qualified moral points of view, the epistemic benefits of less equal procedures must be evident beyond qualified objection. If all doctrines involved in political justification must be qualifiedly acceptable, however, the qualified acceptability requirement must itself be acceptable to qualified points of view. This article provides reasons for doubting that this ‘insularity’ can be achieved, and explores ways of reformulating the principle so that it does not exclude itself.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-10-01
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

View all 12 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
183 ( #23,201 of 50,415 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
31 ( #19,883 of 50,415 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.