Propositionwise judgment aggregation: the general case

Social Choice and Welfare 40 (4):1067-1095 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
In the theory of judgment aggregation, it is known for which agendas of propositions it is possible to aggregate individual judgments into collective ones in accordance with the Arrow-inspired requirements of universal domain, collective rationality, unanimity preservation, non-dictatorship and propositionwise independence. But it is only partially known (e.g., only in the monotonic case) for which agendas it is possible to respect additional requirements, notably non-oligarchy, anonymity, no individual veto power, or implication preservation. We fully characterize the agendas for which there are such possibilities, thereby answering the most salient open questions about propositionwise judgment aggregation. Our results build on earlier results by Nehring and Puppe (2002), Nehring (2006), Dietrich and List (2007a) and Dokow and Holzman (2010a).
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Revision history
Archival date: 2016-08-30
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Pauly, Marc & van Hees, Martin

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Introduction to Judgment Aggregation.List, Christian & Polak, Ben

View all 7 citations / Add more citations

Added to PP index

Total views
184 ( #17,479 of 42,137 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #34,671 of 42,137 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.