Strategy-proof judgment aggregation

Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300 (2005)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
Reprint years
2007
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LISSJA
Upload history
First archival date: 2016-09-06
Latest version: 2 (2020-04-24)
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
506 ( #9,989 of 56,973 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
32 ( #24,194 of 56,973 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.