Strategy-proof judgment aggregation

Economics and Philosophy 23 (3):269-300 (2007)
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Abstract
Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
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Archival date: 2016-09-06
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References found in this work BETA
Arrow's Theorem in Judgment Aggregation.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2007 - Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33.
Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Pauly, Marc & van Hees, Martin

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Citations of this work BETA
Judgment Aggregation: A Survey.List, Christian & Puppe, Clemens
Judgment Aggregation Without Full Rationality.Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian

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