What is it Like to be a Group Agent?

Noûs:295-319 (2016)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness. In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.
Reprint years
2015, 2016, 2017, 2018
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2016-09-24
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
739 ( #8,718 of 69,110 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
76 ( #9,807 of 69,110 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.