What is it Like to be a Group Agent?
Noûs:295-319 (2016)
Abstract
The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness. In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication of my argument for the normative status of group agents.
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Archival date: 2016-09-24
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2015-07-08
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2015-07-08
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739 ( #8,718 of 69,110 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
76 ( #9,807 of 69,110 )
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