Dividing Away Doxastic Dilemmas

In Nick Hughes (ed.), Epistemic Dilemmas. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
It seems that different epistemic norms can come into conflict and so we might wonder what happens when they do impose incompatible requirements upon us. According to the dilemmic view, they might sometimes generate sets of requirements that cannot be satisfied, ensuring that there is no rationally acceptable way for a thinker to deal with the predicament she’s in. After reviewing the case for the dilemmic view, I introduce an alternative framework that accounts for the appearance of dilemma-like conflicts without committing us to the possibility of genuine dilemmas. I argue that this alternative view has some important explanatory virtues that the dilemmic view lacks and can account for the problematic intuitions that seem to support the dilemmic view.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
First archival date: 2020-07-27
Latest version: 2 (2021-05-09)
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
175 ( #30,061 of 2,426,328 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #11,940 of 2,426,328 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.