Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?
Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398 (2020)
Abstract
A familiar complaint about conciliatory approaches to disagreement is that they
are self-defeating or incoherent because they ‘call for their own rejection’. This complaint
seems to be influential but it isn’t clear whether conciliatory views call for their own
rejection or what, if anything, this tells us about the coherence of such views. We shall look
at two ways of developing this self-defeat objection and we shall see that conciliatory views
emerge unscathed. A simple version of the self-defeat objection leaves conciliatory views
untouched. A subtle version of the objection contains a subtle but overlooked flaw. If the
conciliatory view is right, it might be right to be dogmatically conciliatory (i.e., to continue to
be conciliatory however objectionable this might seem to ourselves and to others).
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2018-10-30
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2018-10-30
Total views
318 ( #17,188 of 57,134 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
56 ( #12,835 of 57,134 )
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