Small Stakes Give You the Blues: The Skeptical Costs of Pragmatic Encroachment

Manuscrito: Revista Internacional de Filosofía (forthcoming)
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Abstract

According to the fallibilist, it is possible for us to know things when our evidence doesn't entail that our beliefs are correct. Even if there is some chance that we're mistaken about p, we might still know that p is true. Fallibilists will tell you that an important virtue of their view is that infallibilism leads to skepticism. In this paper, we'll see that fallibilist impurism has considerable skeptical consequences of its own. We've missed this because we've focused our attention on the high-stakes cases that they discuss in trying to motivate their impurism about knowledge. We'll see this once we think about the fallibilist impurist's treatment of low-stakes cases.

Author's Profile

Clayton Littlejohn
Australian Catholic University

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