Fictionalism, Realism, Empiricism on Scientific Models
Abstract
This paper defends an approach to modeling and models in science that is against model fictionalism of a recent stripe (the “new fictionalism” that takes models to be abstract entities that are analogous to works of fiction). It further argues that there is a version of fictionalism on models to which my approach is neutral and which only makes sense if one adopts a special sort of antirealism (e.g. constructive empiricism). Otherwise, my approach strongly suggests that one stays away from fictionalism and embraces realism directly.Author's Profile
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2014-11-20
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2014-11-20
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176 (#44,333)
6 months
16 (#57,090)
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