Phenomenal Experience and the Thesis of Revelation

In Dena Shottenkirk, Manuel Curado & Steven S. Gouveia (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge. pp. 227-251 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

In the philosophy of mind, revelation is the claim that the nature of qualia is revealed in phenomenal experience. In the literature, revelation is often thought of as intuitive but in tension with physicalism. While mentions of revelation are frequent, there is room for further discussion of how precisely to formulate the thesis of revelation and what it exactly amounts to. Drawing on the work of David Lewis, this paper provides a detailed discussion on how the thesis of revelation, as well as its incompatibility with physicalism, is to be understood.

Author's Profile

Michelle Liu
Monash University

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-06-09

Downloads
863 (#22,119)

6 months
229 (#9,683)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?