The Sure-thing Principle and P2
Economics Letters 159:221-223 (2017)
Abstract
This paper offers a fine analysis of different versions of the well known sure-thing principle. We show that Savage's formal formulation of the principle, i.e., his second postulate (P2), is strictly stronger than what is intended originally.
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References found in this work BETA
The Foundations of Statistics.Savage, Leonard J.
Difficulties in the Theory of Personal Probability.Savage, Leonard J.
Citations of this work BETA
Two Tales of Epistemic Models.Liu, Yang
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2017-10-21
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2017-10-21
Total views
121 ( #24,868 of 43,699 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
50 ( #14,548 of 43,699 )
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