Causes As Difference‐Makers For Processes
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 98 (1):89-106 (2019)
Abstract
It is natural to think of causes as difference-makers. What exact difference causes make, however, is an open question. In this paper, I argue that the right way of understanding difference-making is in terms of causal processes: causes make a difference to a causal process that leads to the effect. I will show that this way of understanding difference-making nicely captures the distinction between causing an outcome and helping determine how the outcome happens and, thus, explains why causation is not transitive. Moreover, the theory handles tricky cases that are problematic for competing accounts of difference-making.
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Archival date: 2017-06-24
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Contrastive Causation.Schaffer, Jonathan
Causes and Explanations: A Structural-Model Approach. Part I: Causes.Halpern, Joseph Y. & Pearl, Judea
Prevention, Preemption, and the Principle of Sufficient Reason.Hitchcock, Christopher
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2017-06-23
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2017-06-23
Total downloads
55 ( #27,276 of 37,116 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
9 ( #27,440 of 37,116 )
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