Gassendi and Hobbes

In Stephen Gaukroger (ed.), Knowledge in Modern Philosophy. Great Britain: Bloomsbury. pp. 27-43 (2018)
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Abstract

Gassendi and Hobbes knew each other, and their approaches to philosophy often seem similar. They both criticized the Cartesian epistemology of clear and distinct perception. Gassendi engaged at length with skepticism, and also rejected the Aristotelian notion of scientia, arguing instead for a probabilistic view that shows us how we can move on in the absence of certain and evident knowledge. Hobbes, in contrast, retained the notion of scientia, which is the best sort of knowledge and involves causal explanation. He thought, however, that this sort of knowledge was only available in geometry and political philosophy.

Author Profiles

Stewart Duncan
University at Buffalo
Antonia LoLordo
University of Virginia

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