Future Ontology: Indeterminate Existence or Non-existence?

Philosophia 48 (4):1493-1500 (2020)
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Abstract

The Growing Block Theory of time says that the metaphysical openness of the future should be understood in terms of there not being any future objects or events. But in a series of works, Ross Cameron, Elizabeth Barnes, and Robbie Williams have developed a competing view that understands metaphysical openness in terms of it being indeterminate whether there exist future objects or events. I argue that the three reasons they give for preferring their account are not compelling. And since the notion of “indeterminate existence” suffers conceptual problems, the Growing Block is the preferable view.

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Michael Longenecker
Zhongnan University of Economics and Law

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