Is consequentialist perdurantism in moral trouble?

Synthese 198 (11):10979-10990 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
There has been a growing worry that perdurantism—and similarly ontologically abundant views—is morally untenable. For perdurantism posits that, coinciding with persons, are person-like objects, and giving them their moral due seems to require giving up prudentially driven self-sacrifice. One way to avoid this charge is to adopt consequentialism. But Mark Johnston has argued that the marriage of consequentialism and perdurantism is in moral trouble. For, depending on the nature of time, consequentialist perdurantists either are unable to do more than one good act or they are morally obliged to adopt a repugnant form of ageism. I argue both that perdurantist consequentialism doesn’t have the latter implication, and that there’s at least one plausible form of consequentialism that perdurantists can adopt to avoid the former implication.
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LONICP
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-07-04
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-07-03

Total views
36 ( #58,540 of 2,448,729 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #53,394 of 2,448,729 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.