Non-concrete parts of material objects

Synthese 195 (11):5091-5111 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This article offers a novel solution to the problem of material constitution: by including non-concrete objects among the parts of material objects, we can avoid having a statue and its constituent piece of clay composed of all the same proper parts. Non-concrete objects—objects that aren’t concrete, but possibly are—have been used in defense of the claim that everything necessarily exists. But the account offered shows that non-concreta are independently useful in other domains as well. The resulting view falls under a ‘nonmaterial partist’ class of views that includes, in particular, Laurie Paul’s and Kathrin Koslicki’s constitution views; ones where material objects have properties or structures as parts respectively. The article gives reasons for preferring the non-concretist solution over these other non-material partist views and defends it against objections.
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LONNPO-4
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-08-29
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-05-30

Total views
89 ( #37,614 of 53,597 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
20 ( #30,970 of 53,597 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.