Indeterminate actuality and the open future

Analysis 73 (2):248-260 (2013)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The aim of this article is to propose a novel supervaluationist theory of ‘actually’ in the open future. First, I will argue that any adequate theory of actuality in a branching setting must comply with three main desiderata. Second, I will prove that none of the actuality operators that have been proposed in the literature is up to the task. Finally, I will propose a novel theory of actuality in the open future combining one of the existing definitions of the actuality operator with a new definition of the historical possibility operator, and argue for its adequacy. The central feature of the theory I will advance is the introduction of an actuality parameter capable of being shifted by the historical possibility operator. I will argue that this account appears to not only be consistent with the idea that the future is genuinely open, but also with the general idea that ‘actually’ is, in a relevant sense, a ‘rigid’ operator
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LOSIAA
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-10-25
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Demonstratives: An Essay on the Semantics, Logic, Metaphysics and Epistemology of Demonstratives and Other Indexicals.David Kaplan - 1989 - In Joseph Almog, John Perry & Howard Wettstein (eds.), Themes From Kaplan. Oxford University Press. pp. 481-563.

View all 15 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2013-03-01

Total views
125 ( #24,596 of 43,938 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #42,997 of 43,938 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.