No ground for doomsday

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
ABSTRACTThe ability of providing an adequate supervenience base for tensed truths may seem to be one of the main theoretical advantages of both the growing-block and the moving-spotlight theory of time over presentism. However, in this paper I will argue that some propositions appear to be as problematic for growing-block theorists as past-directed propositions are for presentists, namely propositions stating that nothing will be the case in the future. Furthermore, I will show that the moving-spotlight theory can adequately address all the main supervenience challenges that can be levelled against A-theories of time. I will, thus, conclude that, at least as far as the supervenience principle is concerned, the moving-spotlight theory should be preferred over both presentism and the growing-block theory.
Categories
ISBN(s)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LOSNGF
Revision history
First archival date: 2019-05-03
Latest version: 2 (2019-05-15)
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Truth and Truthmakers.Armstrong, D. M.
Modal Logic as Metaphysics.Williamson, Timothy
Truth and Ontology.Merricks, Trenton
Four Dimensionalism.Sider, Theodore

View all 50 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-05-03

Total views
68 ( #36,621 of 47,404 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #27,953 of 47,404 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.