Because I Said So: Practical Authority in Plato’s Crito

Polis 32 (1):3-31 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
This essay is an analysis of the central arguments in Plato’s Crito. The dialogue shows, in a variety of ways, that the opinion of another person can have practical relevance in one’s deliberations about what to do – e.g. as an argument, as a piece of expert advice, as a threat. Especially important among these forms of practical relevance is the relevance of authoritative commands. In the dialogue, the Laws of Athens argue that Socrates must accept his sentence of death, because he must regard the court’s verdict as a command from a practical authority – the city. The Laws’ arguments rely on special features of authority-reasons that many commentators have overlooked. This article explains why the Law’s arguments are unsuccessful. Finally, it is argued that Socrates’ description of ‘the many’ suggests that the city lacks the deliberative capacity necessary for possessing practical authority.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LOTBIS
Revision history
Archival date: 2019-08-16
View upload history
References found in this work BETA
Socrates and the Laws of Athens.Brickhouse, Thomas C. & Smith, Nicholas D.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2019-05-23

Total views
16 ( #40,905 of 42,137 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
16 ( #30,599 of 42,137 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.