Moral Implications from Cognitive (Neuro)Science? No Clear Route
Ethics 127 (1):241-256 (2016)
Abstract
Joshua Greene argues that cognitive (neuro)science matters for ethics in two ways,
the “direct route” and the “indirect route.” Greene illustrates the direct route with
a debunking explanation of the inclination to condemn all incest. The indirect
route is an updated version of Greene’s argument that dual-process moral psychology
gives support for consequentialism over deontology. I consider each of
Greene’s arguments, and I argue that neither succeeds. If there is a route from
cognitive (neuro)science to ethics, Greene has not found it.
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2017-01-17
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Recent downloads (6 months)
62 ( #11,633 of 56,122 )
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