Going Wide: extended mind and Wittgenstein

Adaptive Behavior:275-283 (2018)
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Extended mind remains a provocative approach to cognition and mentality. However, both those for and against this approach have tacitly accepted that cognition or mentality can be understood in terms of those sub personal processes ongoing during some task. I label this a process view of cognition (PV). Using Wittgenstein’s philosophical approach, I argue that proponents of extended mind should reject PV and instead endorse a ‘wide view’ of mentality. This wide view clarifies why the hypothesis of extended mind (HEM) is incoherent. However, this view also indicates why the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) could be true.

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Victor Loughlin
University of Antwerp


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