A Simple Proof of Grounding Internality

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):154-166 (2019)
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Abstract
Some people think that grounding is a type of identity. And some people think that grounding connections hold necessarily. I show that, under plausible assumptions, if grounding is a type of identity, then grounding connections hold necessarily.
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Archival date: 2021-02-09
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2019-05-22

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