Mary Anne Warren on “Full” Moral Status

Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (4):509-30 (2004)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In the contemporary debate on moral status, it is not uncommon to find philosophers who embrace the the Principle of Full Moral Status, according to which the degree to which an entity E possesses moral status is proportional to the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties until a threshold degree of morally relevant properties possession is reached, whereupon the degree to which E possesses morally relevant properties may continue to increase, but the degree to which E possesses moral status remains the same. One philosopher who has contributed significantly to the contemporary debate on moral status and embraces the Principle of Full Moral Status is Mary Anne Warren. Warren holds not only that it is possible for some entities to possess full moral status, but that some entities actually do, e.g., normal adult human beings. I argue that two of Warren’s primary arguments for the Principle of Full Moral Status—the Argument from Pragmatism and the Argument from Explanatory Power—are significantly flawed.
Keywords
Categories
ISBN(s)
0038-4283
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LOVMAW
Upload history
Archival date: 2012-07-08
View other versions
Added to PP index
2010-09-14

Total views
976 ( #3,489 of 53,497 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
75 ( #7,449 of 53,497 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.