Peter A. Railton and the objective moral realism

Per la Filosofia (45):99-109 (1999)
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Abstract
Peter Railton argues for a form of moral realism which holds that moral judgments can bear truth values in a fundamental non-epistemic sense of truth; that moral properties are objective, though relational; that moral properties supervene upon natural properties, and may be reducible to them; that moral inquiry is of a piece with empirical inquiry. He also thinks that it cannot be known a priori whether bivalence holds for moral judgments, and that a rational agent may fail to have a reason for obeying moral imperatives, although they may be applicable to him. In this paper, Railton's moral theories are carefully examined and compared with noncognitivistic ones.
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Archival date: 2012-10-31
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