The mental and the normative: A non-psychological account

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Abstract
(draft; call for comments) The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of believing or intending and surely they are an irremovable element in constitutive aims of believing or intending. Many philosophers have claimed that the intentional is normative (this claim is the analogue, within the philosophy of mind, of the claim that is often made within the philosophy of language, that meaning is normative). The normative judgements are grounded in intrinsic features of the intentional states of the human mind. Our intentional states are always correlated with our dispositions; when I refer to our ?dispositions? here, I do not mean to focus exclusively on our behavioural dispositions; I mean to include our mental dispositions as well, such as our dispositions to revise our beliefs and intentions in response to various conditions. We can hold that the normative nature of our judgement is intrinsic with our rational dispositions: the rational dispositions of our mind have essential normative properties, even if we must not identify mental properties with their normative role in mental activity.In this contest I deal with the concepts of factual ultimate aim and normative ultimate aim.
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Archival date: 2012-10-31
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