Causal closure principles and emergentism

Philosophy 75 (294):571-586 (2000)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Causal closure arguments against interactionist dualism are currently popular amongst physicalists. Such an argument appeals to some principles of the causal closure of the physical, together with certain other premises, to conclude that at least some mental events are identical with physical events. However, it is crucial to the success of any such argument that the physical causal closure principle to which it appeals is neither too strong nor too weak by certain standards. In this paper, it is argued that various forms of naturalistic dualism, of an emergentist character, are consistent with the strongest physical causal closure principles that can plausibly be advocated.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LOWCCP
Upload history
Archival date: 2015-10-04
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
1,096 ( #3,369 of 57,106 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
58 ( #12,272 of 57,106 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.