Sobre la ontología inmaterialista: el concepto de idea en Berkeley / On Immaterialist Ontology: Berkeley's Concept of Idea

Areté. Revista de Filosofía 2 (31):427-449 (2019)
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Abstract
Berkeley’s immaterialist philosophy has been frequently underestimated as a result of the misunderstanding of his ontological proposal, specifically because of the complexity of his concept of idea. The aim of this paper is then to clarify and explain that concept because from it depends the correct understanding of Berkeley’s ontological and immaterialist proposal. To do this, 1) I will show some examples of the misunderstanding that the berkeleian proposal has had, mainly due to his concept of idea; 2) I will track how this notion was being developed in Berkeley’s early notes, known as Philosophical Commentaries; 3) I will analyze and explain the concept of idea from the published work of Berkeley, that is, from the Principles and Dialogues. La filosofía inmaterialista de Berkeley ha sido muchas veces infravalorada por la mala comprensión de su propuesta ontológica, específicamente por la dificultad que presenta su concepto de idea. El propósito de este artículo es, entonces, esclarecer y explicar dicho concepto porque de ello depende entender correctamente la ontología y el inmaterialismo filosófico berkeleyano. Para realizar esto 1) mostraré algunos ejemplos de la mala comprensión que ha tenido la propuesta berkeleyana, debido principalmente a su concepto de idea; 2) rastrearé cómo se fue conformando dicho concepto en las notas de juventud conocidas como Comentarios Filosóficos; 3) analizaré y explicaré el concepto de idea a partir de la obra publicada de los Principios y los Diálogos.
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Archival date: 2019-11-12
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