Are Reference Rules Inessential to Meaning?

Metaphysics 3 (1):92-102 (2020)
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Abstract

This article responds to a case-based argument by Mark Richard that rule of reference is not essential to meaning. It objects that the argument requires shifting between understanding the relevant term in the case, ‘marriage,’ as a determinable, in order to support one premise, and a determinate, in order to support another. On no univocal interpretation can both premises be made true.

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Kirk Ludwig
Indiana University, Bloomington

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