Collective intentional behavior from the standpoint of semantics

Noûs 41 (3):355–393 (2007)
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This paper offers an analysis of the logical form of plural action sentences that shows that collective actions so ascribed are a matter of all members of a group contributing to bringing some event about. It then uses this as the basis for a reductive account of the content of we-intentions according to which what distinguishes we-intentions from I-intentions is that we-intentions are directed about bringing it about that members of a group act in accordance with a shared plan.
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Intentionality.Searle, John
On Social Facts.Gilbert, Margaret

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Shared Intentions, Loose Groups and Pooled Knowledge.Roy, Olivier & Schwenkenbecher, Anne

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