Dispositions, Laws, and Categories

Metaphysica 8 (2):211-220 (2007)
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After a short sketch of Lowe’s account of his four basic categories, I discuss his theory of formal ontological relations and how Lowe wants to account for dispositional predications. I argue that on the ontic level Lowe is a pan-categoricalist, while he is a language dualist and an exemplification dualist with regard to the dispositional/categorical distinction. I argue that Lowe does not present an adequate account of disposition. From an Aristotelian point of view, Lowe conflates dispositional predication with hôs epi to poly statements about what is normally or mostly the case

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Ludger Jansen
PTH Brixen College


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