Reply to Ferrero

Methode: Analytic Perspectives 4 (6):75-87 (2015)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
I respond to Ferrero’s comments on “What are Conditional Intentions?” in three parts. In the first, I address three arguments Ferrero gives for his account and against mine, the argument from requirement of a formal distinction, the argument from continuity, and the argument from the rational pressures of intention. In the second, I raise some problems for Ferrero’s views on the basis drawing out its consequences and testing those against cases. In the third, I consider in a more theoretical vein how reasons and intentions are related, and offer an explanation of why we should not read reasons for intentions into their contents.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LUDRTF
Revision history
Archival date: 2015-12-04
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2015-12-04

Total views
96 ( #22,197 of 38,039 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
7 ( #31,562 of 38,039 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.