Moral Dilemma and Moral Sense A Phenomenological Account

Journal of Speculative Philosophy 29 (2):218-235 (2015)
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Abstract

In this paper I argue that a phenomenological account of moral sense-bestowal can provide valuable insight into the possibility of moral dilemmas. I propose an account of moral sense-bestowal that is grounded in the phenomenology of expression that Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed throughout the course of his philosophical work, and most explicitly in the period immediately following the publication of Phenomenology of Perception. Based on this Merleau-Pontian account of moral sense-bestowal, I defend the view that there are genuine moral dilemmas, i.e., that we can be faced with situations of conflicting oughts that we cannot resolve without moral remainder.

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Bryan Lueck
Southern Illinois University Edwardsville

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