Knowledge and the epistemic function of argumentation – Comment on Gascón's "Where are dissent and reasons in epistemic justification?"

In Catarina Dutilh Novaes, Henrike Jansen, Jan Albert Van Laar & Bart Verheij (eds.), Reason to Dissent. Proceedings of the 3rd European Conference on Argumentation. College Publications. pp. 219-224 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
José Ángel Gascón’s essay "Where are dissent and reasons in epistemic justification?" is an exposition of a version of a social functionalist epistemology. I agree with Gascón's emphasis on reasons and on taking into account dissent as important parts of epistemology. But I think that these concerns do not require a social functionalist epistemology, but that, on the contrary, Gascón's social functionalist epistemology throws the baby out with the bathwater. It does so by excluding also a traditional, at its core individualistic epistemology, which defines central concepts like 'justified', 'knowledge' still in individualistic terms as the result of a mental cognizing process but is open to social extensions, e.g. concerning cooperation in the acquisition of knowledge or the transfer of knowledge via argumentation. Such a socially open epistemology with an individualistic core – or "open individualistic epistemology" for short – is also the basis of the epistemological argumentation theory. In the following I want to explain and defend this open individualistic epistemology together with the epistemological argumentation theory (sect. 2) and explain on this basis some problems of Gascón’s theory (sect. 3).
Categories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
LUMKAT
Upload history
Archival date: 2020-10-13
View other versions
Added to PP index
2020-10-13

Total views
15 ( #53,659 of 53,714 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
15 ( #36,962 of 53,714 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.