Why Know-how and Propositional Knowledge Are Mutually Irreducible

In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was Dürfen Wir Glauben? Was Sollen Wir Tun? - Sektionsbeiträge des Achten Internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft Für Analytische Philosophie E.V. DuEPublico. pp. 365-371 (2013)
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Abstract
The distinction between knowing how to do something and knowing that something is the case is a piece of common sense. Still, it has been suggested that one of these concepts can be reduced to the other one. Intellectualists like Jason Stanley (2011) try to reduce know-how to propositional knowledge, while practicalists like Stephen Hetherington (2011) try to reduce propositional knowledge to know-how. I argue that both reductionist programs fail because they make the manifestations of the knowledge to be reduced unintelligible. Contrary to both, I suggest that know-how and propositional knowledge are distinct, but conceptually interdependent.
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Knowing How.Stanley, Jason & Willlamson, Timothy

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