Being Self-Deceived about One’s Own Mental State

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
A familiar puzzle about self-deception concerns how self-deception is possible in light of the paradoxes generated by a plausible way of defining it. A less familiar puzzle concerns how a certain type of self-deception—being self-deceived about one's own intentional mental state—is possible in light of a plausible way of understanding the nature of self-knowledge. According to this understanding, we ordinarily do not infer our mental states from evidence, but then it's puzzling how this sort of self-deception could occur given that self-deception arises from the mistreatment of evidence. This article argues that to accommodate this kind of self-deception we should accept that sometimes ordinary self-knowledge is inferential, but that this idea needn’t be so unappealing. In particular, by showing that such inferential self-knowledge can be both ‘transparent’ and ‘direct’, the article argues that it need not imply having an abnormal, ‘alienated’ relation to the mental state.
No keywords specified (fix it)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
Upload history
Archival date: 2021-11-08
View other versions
Added to PP index

Total views
47 ( #58,504 of 65,545 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
47 ( #18,127 of 65,545 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.