Self-deception and shifts of attention

Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):63-75 (2014)
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Abstract
A prevalent assumption among philosophers who believe that people can intentionally deceive themselves (intentionalists) is that they accomplish this by controlling what evidence they attend to. This article is concerned primarily with the evaluation of this claim, which we may call ‘attentionalism’. According to attentionalism, when one justifiably believes/suspects that not-p but wishes to make oneself believe that p, one may do this by shifting attention away from the considerations supportive of the belief that not-p and onto considerations supportive of the belief that p. The details of this theory are elaborated, its theoretical importance is pointed out, and it is argued that the strategy is supposed to work by leading to the repression of one’s knowledge of the unwelcome considerations. However, I then show that the assumption that this is possible is opposed by the balance of a relevant body of empirical research, namely, the thought-suppression literature, and so intentionalism about self-deception cannot find vindication in the attentional theory.
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2014
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Archival date: 2014-04-01
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References found in this work BETA
Intention.Anscombe, G. E. M.
Intention.Chisholm, Roderick M.
The Folk Concept of Intentionality.Knobe, Joshua & Malle, Bertram
Real Self-Deception.Mele, Alfred R.

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Self-Deception.Deweese-Boyd, Ian

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2013-09-23

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