General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume’s Treatise

Hume Studies 27 (2):247-278 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An examination of the role played by general rules in Hume's positive (nonskeptical) epistemology. General rules for Hume are roughly just general beliefs. The difference between justified and unjustified belief is a matter of the influence of good versus bad general rules, the good general rules being the "extensive" and "constant" ones.

Author's Profile

Jack Lyons
University of Glasgow

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-11-24

Downloads
463 (#18,066)

6 months
45 (#21,413)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?