General Rules and the Justification of Probable Belief in Hume’s Treatise

Hume Studies 27 (2):247-278 (2001)
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Abstract
An examination of the role played by general rules in Hume's positive (nonskeptical) epistemology. General rules for Hume are roughly just general beliefs. The difference between justified and unjustified belief is a matter of the influence of good versus bad general rules, the good general rules being the "extensive" and "constant" ones.
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Archival date: 2010-11-24
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