Unconscious Evidence

Philosophical Issues 26 (1):243-262 (2016)
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Abstract
Can beliefs that are not consciously formulated serve as part of an agent's evidence for other beliefs? A common view says no, any belief that is psychologically immediate is also epistemically immediate. I argue that some unconscious beliefs can serve as evidence, but other unconscious beliefs cannot. Person-level beliefs can serve as evidence, but subpersonal beliefs cannot. I try to clarify the nature of the personal/subpersonal distinction and to show how my proposal illuminates various epistemological problems and provides a principled framework for solving other problems.
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Archival date: 2016-08-22
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Varieties of Inference?Malmgren, Anna‐Sara
Unconscious Perceptual Justification.Berger, Jacob; Nanay, Bence & Quilty-Dunn, Jake

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