Again on Sextus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence

Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 99 (2):212-228 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This paper engages with Svavar Svavarsson’s recent essay, “Sextus Empiricus on Persuasiveness and Equipollence,” arguing against both (i) his interpretation of whether two rival arguments appear equipollent to the Pyrrhonist because he himself is equally persuaded by both of them, and (ii) his interpretation of the way in which the argument from possible disagreement is supposed to induce suspension of judgment in the Pyrrhonist. In so doing, I aim to dispel some serious misunderstandings regarding key aspects of the Pyrrhonist’s skeptical outlook and argumentative practice.

Author's Profile

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-11-17

Downloads
675 (#23,353)

6 months
122 (#32,495)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?