Moral Powers and Forgivable Evils

In Kathryn Norlock & Andrea Veltman (eds.), Evil, Political Violence and Forgiveness: Essays in Honor of Claudia Card. Lexington (2009)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In The Atrocity Paradigm, Claudia Card suggests we forgiveness as a potentially valuable exercise of a victim's moral powers. Yet Card never makes explicit just what 'moral powers' are, or how to understand their grounding or scope. I draw out unacknowledged implications of her framework: namely, that others than the primary victim may forgive, and -- conversely -- that some victims may find themselves morally dis-empowered. Furthermore, talk of "moral powers" allows us to appropriately acknowledge the value of refusals to forgive and the issue of "forgivable" evils, in ways that talk of forgiveness as a duty or virtue cannot.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MACMPA-2
Revision history
Archival date: 2014-02-24
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2010-09-21

Total views
336 ( #13,252 of 49,999 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #37,052 of 49,999 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.