Taking Demands Out of Blame

In D. Justin Coates & Neal A. Tognazzini (eds.), Blame: Its Nature and Norms. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 141-161 (2012)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The idea that demands are a key constituent of any analysis of the negative reactive attitudes is rarely challenged, enjoying a freedom from scrutiny uncommon in philosophy. In this paper I press on this orthodox view, arguing that there are broadly speaking, three ways in which the term ‘demand’ is used in discussions of the negative reactive attitudes and that each is problematic.

Author's Profile

Coleen Macnamara
University of California, Riverside

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-09-20

Downloads
495 (#46,180)

6 months
108 (#49,389)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?