Epistemic Value and the New Evil Demon

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):89-107 (2017)
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Abstract
In this article I argue that the value of epistemic justification cannot be adequately explained as being instrumental to truth. I intend to show that false belief, which is no means to truth, can nevertheless still be of epistemic value. This in turn will make a good prima facie case that justification is valuable for its own sake. If this is right, we will have also found reason to think that truth value monism is false: assuming that true belief does have value, there is more of final epistemic value than mere true belief
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Archival date: 2014-05-04
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Knowledge and its Limits.Williamson, Timothy

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An Argument for Uniqueness About Evidential Support.Dogramaci, Sinan & Horowitz, Sophie

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