Implicit Bias, Moods, and Moral Responsibility

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):53-78 (2018)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
Are individuals morally responsible for their implicit biases? One reason to think not is that implicit biases are often advertised as unconscious, ‘introspectively inaccessible’ attitudes. However, recent empirical evidence consistently suggests that individuals are aware of their implicit biases, although often in partial and inarticulate ways. Here I explore the implications of this evidence of partial awareness for individuals’ moral responsibility. First, I argue that responsibility comes in degrees. Second, I argue that individuals’ partial awareness of their implicit biases makes them (partially) morally responsible for them. I argue by analogy to a close relative of implicit bias: moods.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MADIBM-5
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-08-31
View other versions
Added to PP index
2017-08-31

Total views
950 ( #4,083 of 56,900 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
169 ( #2,909 of 56,900 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.