Demonstrative induction and the skeleton of inference

Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
It has been common wisdom for centuries that scientific inference cannot be deductive; if it is inference at all, it must be a distinctive kind of inductive inference. According to demonstrative theories of induction, however, important scientific inferences are not inductive in the sense of requiring ampliative inference rules at all. Rather, they are deductive inferences with sufficiently strong premises. General considerations about inferences suffice to show that there is no difference in justification between an inference construed demonstratively or ampliatively. The inductive risk may be shouldered by premises or rules, but it cannot be shirked. Demonstrative theories of induction might, nevertheless, better describe scientific practice. And there may be good methodological reasons for constructing our inferences one way rather than the other. By exploring the limits of these possible advantages, I argue that scientific inference is neither of essence deductive nor of essence inductive
Keywords
No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
(categorize this paper)
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MAGDIA-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2018-06-06
View other versions
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total views
129 ( #41,889 of 65,636 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
5 ( #62,749 of 65,636 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.