Plain Paritculars

Grazer Philosophische Studien 92 (1):87-108 (2015)
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Are concrete objects in some sense made up of the properties they exemplify? A distinguished tradition holds they are. I begin by defending the distinction: there is a real and not just semantic distinction between asserting and denying that concrete objects have their properties as parts. I then argue in favor of the view that concrete objects are not made up of their parts. First, this view has less ontological baggage than its opponent. Next, the supposed advantages of the alternative view—its superiority in understanding persistence, exemplification, or the possibility of diverse duplicates—dissipate under analysis.
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