What Kind of Is-Ought Gap is There and What Kind Ought There Be?

Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (4):373-393 (2017)
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Abstract
Some philosophers think that there is a gap between is and ought which necessarily makes normative enquiry a different kind of thing than empirical science. This position gains support from our ability to explicate our inferential practices in a way that makes it impermissible to move from descriptive premises to a normative conclusion. But we can also explicate them in a way that allows such moves. So there is no categorical answer as to whether there is or is not a gap. The question of an is-ought gap is a practical and strategic matter rather than a logical one, and it may properly be answered in different ways for different questions or at different times.
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Justice for Hedgehogs.Dworkin, Ronald
A Treatise of Human Nature.Hume, David & Lindsay, A. D.

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2017-02-02

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