The dispositional account of credence

Philosophical Studies 177 (3):727-745 (2020)
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In this paper I offer an alternative - the ‘dispositional account’ - to the standard account of imprecise probabilism. Whereas for the imprecise probabilist, an agent’s credal state is modelled by a set of credence functions, on the dispositional account an agent’s credal state is modelled by a set of sets of credence functions. On the face of it, the dispositional account looks less elegant than the standard account – so why should we be interested? I argue that the dispositional account is actually simpler, because the dispositional choice behaviour that fixes an agent’s credal state is faithfully depicted in the model of that agent’s credal state. I explore some of the implications of the account, including a surprising implication for the debate over dilation.
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Archival date: 2020-12-23
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