The ex ante pareto principle

Journal of Philosophy 114 (6):303-323 (2017)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
The concept of ‘pareto superiority’ plays a central role in ethics, economics, and law. Pareto superiority is sometimes taken as a relation between outcomes, and sometimes as a relation between actions—even where the outcomes of the actions are uncertain. Whether one action is classed as pareto superior to another depends on the prospects under the actions for each person concerned. I argue that a person’s prospects can depend on how that person is designated. Without any constraints on acceptable designators, then, the concept of pareto superiority is ill defined and gives inconsistent results. I consider various ways of completing the definition and draw out some surprising implications.
Categories
(categorize this paper)
Reprint years
2017
ISBN(s)
0022-362X  
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MAHTEA-3
Revision history
Archival date: 2018-03-22
View upload history
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Added to PP index
2017-02-07

Total views
169 ( #16,116 of 39,015 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
24 ( #17,818 of 39,015 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks to external links.