In Defense of a Kripkean Dogma

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Abstract
In “Against Arguments from Reference” (Mallon et al., 2009), Ron Mallon, Edouard Machery, Shaun Nichols, and Stephen Stich (hereafter, MMNS) argue that recent experiments concerning reference undermine various philosophical arguments that presuppose the correctness of the causal-historical theory of reference. We will argue three things in reply. First, the experiments in question—concerning Kripke’s Gödel/Schmidt example—don’t really speak to the dispute between descriptivism and the causal-historical theory; though the two theories are empirically testable, we need to look at quite different data than MMNS do to decide between them. Second, the Gödel/Schmidt example plays a different, and much smaller, role in Kripke’s argument for the causal-historical theory than MMNS assume. Finally, and relatedly, even if Kripke is wrong about the Gödel/Schmidt example—indeed, even if the causal-historical theory is not the correct theory of names for some human languages—that does not, contrary to MMNS’s claim, undermine uses of the causalhistorical theory in philosophical research projects.
ISBN(s)
0031-8205
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MAIIDO
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Archival date: 2016-05-21
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References found in this work BETA
Holism: A Shopper's Guide.Fodor, Jerry A. & Lepore, Ernest

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Citations of this work BETA
If Folk Intuitions Vary, Then What?Machery, Edouard; Mallon, Ron; Nichols, Shaun & Stich, Stephen P.
Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-Cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names.Sytsma, Justin; Livengood, Jonathan; Sato, Ryoji & Oguchi, Mineki

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