Does modularity undermine the pro‐emotion consensus?

Mind and Language 35 (3):277-292 (2020)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
There is a growing consensus that emotions contribute positively to human practical rationality. While arguments that defend this position often appeal to the modularity of emotion-generation mechanisms, these arguments are also susceptible to the criticism, e.g. by Jones (2006), that emotional modularity supports pessimism about the prospects of emotions contributing positively to practical rationality here and now. This paper aims to respond to this criticism by demonstrating how models of emotion processing can accommodate the sorts of cognitive influence required to make the pro-emotion position plausible whilst exhibiting key elements of modularity.
PhilPapers/Archive ID
MAJDMU
Upload history
Archival date: 2019-01-02
View other versions
Added to PP index
2019-01-02

Total views
493 ( #15,596 of 71,429 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
51 ( #15,822 of 71,429 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.