Against Preservation

Analysis 79 (3):424-436 (2019)
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Abstract
Bradley offers a quick and convincing argument that no Boolean semantic theory for conditionals can validate a very natural principle concerning the relationship between credences and conditionals. We argue that Bradley’s principle, Preservation, is, in fact, invalid; its appeal arises from the validity of a nearby, but distinct, principle, which we call Local Preservation, and which Boolean semantic theories can non-trivially validate.
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Archival date: 2018-07-22
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References found in this work BETA
On Conditionals.Edgington, Dorothy
A Theory of Conditionals.Stalnaker, Robert
The Probabilities of Conditionals Revisited.Douven, Igor & Verbrugge, Sara

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2018-07-22

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